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INTRODUCTION 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)1 has proven to be a 
critical tool in the struggle to improve women’s rights around the 
world. The treaty “is one of the most widely ratified human rights 
treaties” in the world.2 Despite its widespread ratification and its 
                                                     
 * Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law. I 
would like to thank Professor Susan Bitensky, Director of the Talsky Center for 
Human Rights of Women and Children, Shannon Smith, Rob Reiland, and the other 
student editors of the Michigan State Law Review. I would also like to thank Jan 
Fox, my Research Assistant, for her excellent work on the Article. 
 1. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force 
Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
 2. Marta R. Vanegas & Lisa R. Pruitt, CEDAW and Rural Development: 
Empowering Women with Law from the Top Down, Activism from the Bottom Up, 41 
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prominence in the global fight for gender equality, the United States 
is among fewer than ten countries around the world that have not 
ratified the treaty.3 This symposium focuses on the ratification debate 
within the United States and asks, most importantly, what might be 
gained from ratification? The answer to this question is complex and 
requires us to explore the challenges involved in implementation of 
the treaty. In this Article, I offer a glimpse of some of the challenges 
in implementing CEDAW in sub-Saharan Africa in an effort to more 
fully understand both the transformative potential and the limitations 
of the treaty as it is applied in one particular regional context.  
Part I of the Article provides a brief background on the treaty. 
Part II offers a concise overview of some of its most critical 
provisions. Part III provides a glimpse of some of the most important 
women’s rights test cases within the region, illustrating the impact 
that CEDAW has had through litigation. Part IV explores CEDAW’s 
contributions to law-reform efforts to improve women’s rights. Part 
V focuses on the ways in which CEDAW has contributed to 
increased public awareness concerning women’s rights. Finally, Part 
VI examines some of the limitations of the treaty and contrasts 
CEDAW with the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the Maputo 
Protocol or the Protocol).4 Part VI concludes that CEDAW has had a 
significant positive impact on women’s rights in the region, 
including the influence of the treaty on the drafting of the Maputo 
Protocol. The CEDAW Committee has much to gain from an 
analysis of the similarities and differences between the two 
instruments, including the ways in which the Maputo Protocol 
explicitly values the role culture can, and often does, play in 
women’s lives. A more nuanced understanding of culture and 
intersectionality will only enhance CEDAW’s effectiveness in the 
                                                                                                                
U. BALT. L. REV. 263, 266 (2012) (“[T]he Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women [CEDAW] is one of the most widely 
ratified human rights treaties in history.” (footnote omitted)). 
 3. Fast Facts About CEDAW, CEDAW 2012, 
http://www.cedaw2012.org/index.php/press-room/fast-facts-about-cedaw (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2014) (noting that the following 7 nations “have NOT ratified 
CEDAW” as of 2013: “the United States, Iran, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan,” 
Palau, and Tonga). 
 4. PROTOCOL TO THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 
ON THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN AFRICA, adopted on July 11, 2003 [hereinafter 
PROTOCOL], available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/rossrights/docs/pdfs/AF-
Women.pdf. 
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region. Maximizing the effectiveness of the treaty will be important 
for the United States if it decides, as it should, to ratify CEDAW.  
I. CEDAW: ITS HISTORY AND BACKGROUND IN BRIEF  
The adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women5 by the United Nations 
General Assembly in December of 1979, and its subsequent entry 
into force in September of 1981, marked a significant milestone in 
the international struggle for women’s human rights.6 The 
Convention, often referred to as an “international bill of rights for 
women,” materialized after decades of advocacy efforts on the part 
of women’s rights activists, diplomats, and U.N. officials to ensure 
equal rights for women.7  
The Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), initially 
established as a subcommittee of the Commission on Human Rights 
in 1946, played perhaps the most fundamental role in paving the way 
for the adoption of CEDAW.8 The CSW, tasked with presenting 
recommendations to ensure the enjoyment of equality of rights for 
women, drafted the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women,9 a precursor to CEDAW, which the General 
Assembly adopted on November 7, 1967.10  
Building upon the Declaration and determining that a binding 
treaty was necessary for full implementation and assurance of equal 
rights for women, the CSW, in collaboration with a working group of 
the Third Committee of the General Assembly, drafted the text of 
what would become the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
                                                     
 5. CEDAW, supra note 1.  
 6. Christine Chinkin, Thoughts on the UN Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), in WITHOUT PREJUDICE: 
CEDAW AND THE DETERMINATION OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN A LEGAL AND CULTURAL 
CONTEXT 5, 5 (Meena Shivdas & Sarah Coleman eds., 2010) (noting that “CEDAW 
is a revolutionary document for women for reasons both at the time of drafting and 
in the way it has evolved”). 
 7. Id.; Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, Sept. 4–15, 
1995, Progress Achieved in the Implementation of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: Report by the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, ¶¶ 1, 16, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.177/7 (June 21, 1995) [hereinafter Progress Achieved]. 
 8. Progress Achieved, supra note 7, ¶¶ 9-12.  
 9. Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, G.A. 
Res. 2263(XXII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2263(XXII) (Nov. 7, 1967).  
 10. Id. 
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of Discrimination against Women.11 The General Assembly adopted 
the draft convention in Resolution 34/180 by a unanimous vote.12 
The Assembly subsequently passed Resolution 54/4 in October of 
1999, establishing an Optional Protocol that allows individual 
complaints to be made against States parties for violations of the 
Convention.13  
As of December 2013, there were 187 States parties to 
CEDAW, 104 of which are also parties to the Optional Protocol.14 
Although nearly all nations have ratified CEDAW, many nations 
have entered reservations to the Convention, some of which include 
reservations that the CEDAW Committee considers to be 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.15 Currently, 
more than seventy-five nations have entered reservations to CEDAW 
with common reservations as to Articles 2 and 16 of the Convention, 
which have been held by the Committee to be core provisions of the 
treaty.16 
II. SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF CEDAW 
CEDAW defines discrimination against women broadly. The 
treaty defines discrimination against women as any:  
distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the 
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of 
equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.17  
The treaty prohibits not only distinctions that intentionally 
discriminate but also those that have the “effect” of discriminating 
                                                     
 11. Progress Achieved, supra note 7, ¶ 12.  
 12. Id. 
 13. G.A. Res. 54/4, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/4 (Oct. 15, 1999).  
 14. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, 54th Sess., Feb. 11–Mar. 1, 2013, at 65, U.N. Doc. A/68/38, GAOR; 68th 
Sess., Supp. No. 38 (2013).  
 15. Reservations to CEDAW, U.N. WOMEN, 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 
2014).  
 16. See id. (“Articles 2 and 16 are considered by the Committee to be core 
provisions of the Convention.”); Declarations, Reservations, and Objections to 
CEDAW, U.N. WOMEN, www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-
country.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2014). 
 17. CEDAW, supra note 1, at 16. 
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against women. This language significantly expands the potential 
reach of CEDAW.18  
Article 2 requires that States parties condemn discrimination 
and use the legal system to aggressively combat discrimination in all 
its forms. Article 2’s reach goes beyond the discriminatory acts of 
the state and requires that States parties take measures “to eliminate 
discrimination against women by any person, organization or 
enterprise.”19 Article 2 also requires States parties to “modify or 
abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which 
constitute discrimination against women.”20  
Article 5 condemns gender stereotyping and requires that States 
parties take appropriate measures “[t]o modify the social and cultural 
patterns . . . [that] are based on the idea of the inferiority or the 
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and 
women.”21 Article 16 is another highly significant provision that 
relates to discrimination in the family.22 Other provisions permit 
affirmative action;23 combat trafficking in women;24 promote 
women’s equality in public life25 by encouraging women’s 
representation in non-governmental organizations26 and development 
planning,27 particularly for rural women;28 and prohibit 
                                                     
 18. See IWRAW ASIA PACIFIC KNOWLEDGE PORTAL, CONVENTION ON THE 
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (CEDAW) 6 
(2009), available at http://www.iwraw-ap.org/convention/doc/cedaw.pdf 
(“[CEDAW’s definition of discrimination] is useful because it helps us identify the 
weaknesses of formal or so called neutral laws and policies. A law or policy may not 
have the intention of denying a woman the enjoyment of rights but if it has the effect 
of doing so then it constitutes discrimination.”). 
 19. CEDAW, supra note 1, at 16. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at 17. 
 22. Id. at 20 (noting that “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures 
to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and 
family relations,” and further mandating protection of a number of specific rights 
such as “[t]he same right to enter into marriage” and “[t]he same rights and 
responsibilities as parents”). 
 23. Id. at 16; see also Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, 30th Sess., 31st Sess., Jan. 12–30, 2004, July 6–23, 
2004, ¶¶ 15, 16, 18, U.N. Doc. A/59/38, Annex I; GAOR, 59th Sess., Supp. No. 38 
(2004). 
 24. CEDAW, supra note 1, at 17. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. at 19. 
 28. Id.  
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discrimination in nationality rights,29 education,30 employment and 
social security,31 health care,32 social and economic life,33 and legal 
capacity.34 
Although it is comprehensive, CEDAW fails to protect against 
some forms of discrimination that had not yet gained international 
attention at the time of its drafting. For example, CEDAW fails to 
explicitly provide protection for members of the lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) community.35 CEDAW 
also fails to provide explicit protection against gender-based 
violence. The CEDAW Committee, however, issued a general 
recommendation, General Recommendation No. 19, which brings 
violence against women within the purview of the Convention by 
explicitly identifying gender-based violence as a form of 
discrimination.36 The next three Parts will analyze the 
implementation of CEDAW and its successful utilization in 
challenging discrimination through domestic litigation, law reform, 
                                                     
 29. Id. at 17. 
 30. Id. at 17-18. 
 31. Id. at 18. 
 32. Id. at 19. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. at 20. 
 35. But see Aleksandra Djordjevic, Has the International Human Rights 
Paradigm Failed Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender People? If So, What Can 
Be Done to Fix It? 45 n.94 (Apr. 2013) (unpublished LLM thesis, University of 
British Columbia) (“CEDAW Committee issued General recommendation No. 28 on 
the core obligations of state parties under article 2 of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women . . . in 2010, which was 
meant to clarify the meaning [of] Article 2 of the CEDAW convention. This article 
regulates the right of women to be free of discrimination and, according to it, ‘[t]he 
discrimination of women based on sex and gender is inextricably linked with other 
factors that affect women, such as race, ethnicity, religion or belief, health, status, 
age, class, caste and sexual orientation and gender identity.’ This shows that the 
committee has decided to include sexual orientation under the category of sex. 
Sexual orientation was considered in some of its concluding observations. CEDAW 
also reacted to the situation in Uganda in 2010 and recommended that its 
government should adopt anti-discrimination legislation and decriminalise 
homosexuality.” (citations omitted) (quoting Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women, 46th Sess., 47th Sess., 48th Sess., July 12–30, 
2010, Oct. 4-22, 2010, Jan. 17–Feb. 4, 2011, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. A/66/38, Annex III; 
GAOR, 66th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (2010))). 
 36. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, 11th Sess., Jan. 20–30, 1992, at 1-6, U.N. Doc. A/47/38; GAOR, 47th 
Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1993) (noting that discrimination against women includes 
gender-based violence—violence directed against a woman because she is a woman 
or violence that affects women disproportionately). 
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and public education before turning to a discussion of the challenges 
and limitations of the Convention. 
III. TEST CASE LITIGATION 
Domestic courts within Africa have, at times, cited to CEDAW 
in important women’s rights test cases.37 In several of the early, high-
profile women’s rights cases in Africa, female plaintiffs challenged 
facially discriminatory laws or policies. Two of these early cases 
represent significant victories for women’s rights advocates within 
the region: Dow and Longwe.38 In the 1990s, a handful of high-
profile cases challenged discrimination in the private sphere and 
proved more difficult for women’s rights plaintiffs to prevail. The 
Magaya case,39 described below, is a 1999 Zimbabwe case in which 
a woman unsuccessfully challenged a discriminatory customary law, 
relying on domestic law and CEDAW.40 Several more recent cases 
from the early 2000s suggest that there may be cause for hope with 
respect to women’s rights challenges to discriminatory laws, even 
customary laws, which were long considered beyond the reach of 
women’s rights litigation.41 As this brief sampling of cases suggests, 
reliance on CEDAW in domestic women’s rights cases within the 
sub-Saharan region has been somewhat successful, particularly in 
cases challenging a law or regulation in the public sphere.  
                                                     
 37. See, e.g., Longwe v. Intercontinental Hotels, (1992) 4 L.R.C. 221 [HC] 
(Zam.), reprinted in TANZANIA WOMEN JUDGES ASSOCIATION, CASE LAW MANUAL 
132, 148 (2013), available at www.tawjatz.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Case-
Law-Manual.pdf. 
 38. See infra Sections III.A-B.  
 39. Magaya v. Magaya, (1999) 3 L.R.C. 35 [SC] (Zimb.), available at 
http://jurisafrica.org/docs/customarylaw/vii_Magaya_v_Magaya_judgment.doc.  
 40. Choice Damiso & Julie Stewart, Zimbabwe and CEDAW Compliance: 
Pursuing Women’s Equality in Fits and Starts, in WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS: 
CEDAW IN INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW 465 (Anne Hellum & 
Henriette Sinding Aasen eds., 2013) [hereinafter WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS] (“The 
Court found that customary law was not subject to the operation of the equality 
provisions in section 23[,] . . . despite arguments urging the application of non-
discrimination principles derived from international instruments including the 
CEDAW.”). 
 41. See, e.g., Bhe v. Khayelitsha 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) (S. Afr.), available 
at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2004/17.html. 
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A. Unity Dow v. Attorney General of Botswana 
The case of Unity Dow v. Attorney General of Botswana42 
illustrates the role that international women’s rights instruments 
played in such test cases. Dow involved the Botswana Citizenship 
Act of 1984, which in accordance with Tswana customary law, 
determined the nationality of children born within Botswana by 
reference solely to the father’s nationality, regardless of the mother’s 
citizenship.43 Unity Dow, a Botswana citizen, had married an 
American man and had three children, two of whom had been born 
and raised in Botswana after the adoption of the Citizenship Act.44 
Under the 1984 Act, Dow’s children were denied Botswana 
citizenship due to their father’s foreign-national status and as a 
result, were forced to travel only on their father’s passport and were 
ineligible for the free university education available to citizens.45 
Dow, a lawyer and activist, challenged this law before a Botswana 
High Court, arguing that it discriminated against women and violated 
the equal protection provisions in the Botswana Constitution.46 
Despite the fact that the anti-discrimination provision within the 
Botswana Constitution did not explicitly prohibit discrimination on 
the basis of sex, the High Court held that this prohibition on sex-
based discrimination was implicit within the spirit of the Constitution 
and thereby declared certain provisions of the Citizenship Act 
unconstitutional.47 In reaching this decision, the High Court 
referenced international instruments that should have persuaded 
Botswana to invalidate the Act, including the 1967 Declaration on 
                                                     
 42. [1991] L.R.C. 574 (Bots.), reprinted in UNITY DOW, THE CITIZENSHIP 
CASE: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA VS UNITY DOW 30 
(1995), available at http://www.law-lib.utoronto.ca/Diana/fulltext/dow1.htm.  
 43. Id. (“Sections 4 and 5 of the Citizenship Act of 1984 read as follows: ‘4. 
(1) A person born in Botswana shall be a citizen of Botswana by birth and descent 
if, at the time of his birth (a) his father was a citizen of Botswana; or (b) in the case 
of a person born out of wedlock, his mother was a citizen of Botswana.’”).  
 44. Id. 
 45. U.N. DEV. FUND FOR WOMEN, BRINGING EQUALITY HOME: 
IMPLEMENTING THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 20 (Ilana Landsberg-Lewis ed., 1998) [hereinafter 
BRINGING EQUALITY HOME]. 
 46. Unity Dow, [1991] L.R.C. 574, reprinted in THE CITIZENSHIP CASE, 
supra note 42, at 30; BRINGING EQUALITY HOME, supra note 45, at 20.  
 47. Unity Dow, [1991] L.R.C. 574, reprinted in THE CITIZENSHIP CASE, 
supra note 42, at 38 (noting that defense counsel had argued that the 
antidiscrimination provisions of Botswana’s constitution related primarily to 
discrimination on the basis of race). 
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the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, stating “[i]t is . . . 
difficult if not impossible to accept that Botswana would deliberately 
discriminate against women in its [Constitution] whilst at the same 
time internationally support non-discrimination against females or a 
section of them.”48  
The Court of Appeal subsequently affirmed the High Court’s 
decision.49 In so doing, it relied on international commitments 
Botswana had made respecting women’s rights, and it noted that at 
the time the Botswana Constitution was drafted, Botswana was 
entering the “comity of civilised nations” influenced by instruments 
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.50 Despite this 
victory for women’s rights, the Citizenship Act of 1984 was not 
officially amended until 1995, when Botswana was in the process of 
ratifying CEDAW.51 
B. Longwe v. Intercontinental Hotels 
In Longwe v. Intercontinental Hotels,52 Sara Longwe, a 
women’s rights activist in Zambia, brought suit against the 
Intercontinental Hotels Corporation for turning her away from one of 
its hotels under its policy prohibiting entry to any woman 
unaccompanied by a male.53 Longwe had been turned away from one 
of the Intercontinental hotels on at least two occasions—once when 
she was picking up her children from a party at the hotel and again 
when she was attending a meeting of a group of women’s activists at 
the hotel.54  
Before the High Court of Zambia, Longwe argued that this 
policy discriminated against women and thereby violated the anti-
discrimination provisions of the Zambian Constitution as well as 
international instruments, such as CEDAW, to which Zambia was 
party.55 While acknowledging that CEDAW would be of use to 
Zambian courts in cases in which domestic law is not on point, the 
                                                     
 48. Id. at 40. 
 49. Att’y Gen. v. Unity Dow (2001) AHRLR 99 (Bots. Ct. App. 1992), 
reprinted in TANZANIA WOMEN JUDGES ASSOCIATION, supra note 37, at 78, 129.  
 50. Id. at 117-18.  
 51. BRINGING EQUALITY HOME, supra note 45, at 21. 
 52. (1992) 4 L.R.C. 221 [HC] (Zam.), reprinted in TANZANIA WOMEN 
JUDGES ASSOCIATION, supra note 37, at 132. 
 53. Id. 
 54. BRINGING EQUALITY HOME, supra note 45, at 23; Interview with Sara 
Longwe, in Beijing, China (Aug. 1995).  
 55. BRINGING EQUALITY HOME, supra note 45, at 23-24. 
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Court in Longwe’s case held that it need only look to the freedom of 
movement and assembly provisions of the Zambian Constitution to 
determine that the hotel’s policy was illegally discriminatory.56 
Regarding the proper role of international treaties in domestic 
jurisprudence, the court stated:  
Before I end, I have to say something about the effect of International 
Treaties and Conventions which the Republic of Zambia enters into and 
ratifies. The African Charter on Human Rights and People’s Rights and 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Discrimination against women 
etc (ante) are two such examples. It is my considered view that ratification 
of such documents by a nation state without reservations is a clear 
testimony of the willingness by that State to be bound by the provisions of 
such a document. Since there is that willingness, if an issue comes before 
this court which would not be covered by local legislation but would be 
covered by such international document, I would take judicial notice of 
that Treaty or Convention in my resolution of the dispute.57 
Thus, despite the Court’s avoidance of international law in its 
determination of the Longwe case, the opinion emphasized the role 
and importance of such international obligations, including CEDAW. 
As such, Longwe has been referenced by other courts in decisions 
relying upon international law to strike discriminatory laws.58 
C. Ephrahim v. Pastory and Another 
Ephrahim v. Pastory59 involved a challenge to a Tanzanian 
statute that incorporated customary law and the interpretation of the 
Constitution, which did not explicitly prohibit discrimination based 
upon sex.60 Plaintiff Holaria Pastory had inherited a plot of clan land 
from her father and, due to financial necessity, had sold this 
property.61 Her nephew subsequently applied to the primary court to 
have the sale declared void as illegal under Haya customary law, 
                                                     
 56. Id. 
 57. Longwe, (1992) 4 L.R.C. 221, reprinted in TANZANIA WOMEN JUDGES 
ASSOCIATION, supra note 37, at 148. 
 58. See, e.g., Rono v. Rono, (2008) 1 K.L.R. 803, 812-14 (C.A.K.) (Kenya), 
available at http://www.kenyalaw.org/family/case_download.php?go= 
71975090857579640119382 (discussing Longwe’s emphasis on the importance of 
international law in analyzing domestic litigation). 
 59. Ephrahim v. Pastory, (1990) L.R.C. 757 [HC] (Tanz.), reprinted in 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN TANZANIA: SELECTED CASES AND MATERIALS 387, 387-88 (Chris 
Maina Peter ed., 1997). 
 60. Id.; BRINGING EQUALITY HOME, supra note 45, at 21. 
 61. Ephrahim, (1990) L.R.C. 757, reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
TANZANIA, supra note 59, at 387. 
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which prohibits women from selling clan land.62 The primary court 
granted the nephew’s application and ordered Pastory to refund the 
profits that she had received from the sale.63 Pastory appealed to the 
district court arguing that the Laws of Inheritance of the Declaration 
of Customary Law of 1963, which include the limitation on women’s 
property rights under Haya law, are unconstitutionally discriminatory 
and violate the Bill of Rights, which had been adopted into the 
Tanzanian Constitution in 1984.64 The district court agreed with 
Pastory, overturning the decision of the primary court and finding 
that Pastory had equal rights as clan men to sell the land that she had 
inherited.65 Pastory’s nephew, Ephrahim, appealed to a High Court of 
Tanzania at Mwanza.66 
In holding the Declaration of Customary Laws of 1963 
unconstitutional, the High Court relied upon Tanzania’s international 
obligations as persuasive evidence that the prohibition of 
discrimination on the basis of sex should be implicitly read into the 
Constitution via the Bill of Rights.67 The Court found that the 
Constitution had explicitly incorporated Article 7 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which prohibits discrimination against 
women, and noted that Tanzania had ratified CEDAW and the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, both of which 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex.68 The Court stated:  
The principles enunciated in the above named documents[, including 
CEDAW, the UDHR, and the African Charter,] are a standard below 
which any civilised nation will be ashamed to fall. It is clear from what I 
have discussed what the customary law under discussion flies in the face 
of our Bill of Rights as well as the international conventions to which we 
are signatories.69 
                                                     
 62. Id. at 388. 
 63. Id. at 387-88. 
 64. Realising Universal Rights in National Jurisdictions, in WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE, supra note 6, at 145, 175-76; BRINGING EQUALITY HOME, supra note 45, 
at 21. 
 65. Realising Universal Rights in National Jurisdictions, supra note 64, at 
175. 
 66. Id.; see Ephrahim, (1990) L.R.C. 757, reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
TANZANIA, supra note 59, at 387. 
 67. See Realising Universal Rights in National Jurisdictions, supra note 64, 
at 175-76; see also BRINGING EQUALITY HOME, supra note 45, at 21. 
 68. Ephrahim, (1990) L.R.C. 757, reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
TANZANIA, supra note 59, at 390. 
 69. Id. 
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The High Court thus held that, in accordance with the 
Tanzanian Bill of Rights and Tanzania’s international obligations 
prohibiting discrimination based on sex, “Section 20 of the 1963 
Rules of Inheritance barring women from selling clan land” would 
be modified such that “males and females would have equal rights to 
inherit and sell clan land.”70 
D. Magaya v. Magaya 
In some African countries, such as Kenya and Zimbabwe, the 
post-colonial constitutions included what I have called exclusionary 
clauses, which specifically exclude customary law and family or 
“personal” law matters from scrutiny under constitutional gender-
equality guarantees.71 In other words, despite the existence of 
equality provisions, these constitutions concurrently contained 
exclusionary clauses that shielded from constitutional equality 
challenges laws deemed customary or familial.72 
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe validated that 
country’s exclusionary clause in the case of Magaya v. Magaya,73 
causing outrage among domestic and international women’s rights 
advocates.74 In Magaya, the Court found that the relevant customary 
                                                     
 70. Realising Universal Rights, supra note 64, at 175-76 (“Section 20 of the 
1963 Rules of Inheritance barring women from selling clan land . . . was now taken 
to be modified and qualified such that males and females would have equal rights to 
inherit and sell clan land. Likewise the rules under the Bukoba Inheritance Rules 
entitling a woman to only usufructuary rights with no power to sell inherited clan 
land were equally void and of no effect.”). 
 71. See Johanna E. Bond, Constitutional Exclusion and Gender in 
Commonwealth Africa, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 289, 292-93 & n.22, 305-06 & n.88 
(2008).  
 72. For example, Lesotho’s Constitution includes a provision guaranteeing 
equality on the basis of sex and other protected categories. It also includes, however, 
the following provision, which exempts family and customary law from the non-
discrimination protection:  
Subsection (1) shall not apply to any law to the extent that that law makes 
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with respect to any matter in the case of person[] who, under [the] law, are 
subject to that law . . . . 
LESOTHO CONST., § 18(4) (1993). 
 73. Magaya v. Magaya, (1999) 3 L.R.C. 35, 42 [SC] (Zimb.). 
 74. David M. Bigge & Amélie von Briesen, Conflict in the Zimbabwean 
Courts: Women’s Rights and Indigenous Self-Determination in Magaya v. Magaya, 
13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 289, 289 (2000). 
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law, which denied women’s inheritance rights, was not subject to the 
equality provisions in the Constitution.75 The Court made this 
conclusion “despite arguments urging the application of non-
discrimination principles derived from international instruments 
including the CEDAW.”76 Magaya was one of a number of cases 
before and during the 1990s that used constitutional exclusionary 
provisions to hinder the use of CEDAW and other equality 
instruments in challenging discriminatory practices that took place in 
the so-called “private” sphere to which family relations and property 
law issues were often relegated.77 Fortunately, as in the Bhe case 
discussed below, courts have more recently reversed this trend, more 
frequently allowing women to successfully challenge discriminatory 
customary laws under international and domestic equality 
provisions.78 
E. Bhe v. Khayelitsha 
In Bhe v. Khayelitsha,79 the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa examined “the constitutionality of the customary law rule of 
primogeniture as applied in cases of intestate succession.”80 One of 
the three plaintiffs involved in the case, Bhe, brought suit in the 
interest of her two minor daughters for title to the home and property 
that had been acquired by their deceased father.81 Under § 23 of the 
Black Administration Act and the Act’s regulations and § 1(4)(b) of 
the Intestate Succession Act, “the two minor children did not qualify 
to be the heirs in the intestate estate of their deceased father.”82 
The Court agreed with Bhe that the customary law of male 
primogeniture violated the right of women to human dignity as 
guaranteed by the Constitution of South Africa and struck down the 
relevant sections of the Black Administration and Intestate 
                                                     
 75. Magaya, (1999) 3 L.R.C. at 35, 42. 
 76. Damiso & Stewart, supra note 40, at 454, 465. 
 77. Johanna E. Bond, Gender, Discourse, and Customary Law in Africa, 83 
S. CAL. L. REV. 509, 515-16 & n.35, 531-32 (2010). 
 78. See discussion infra Section III.E. 
 79. Bhe v. Khayelitsha 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) (S. Afr.), available at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2004/17.html. 
 80. Id.; Bond, supra note 77, at 533. 
 81. CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF S. AFR., MEDIA SUMMARY 2 (Oct. 15, 
2004), available at http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/jus/jus/JUS5910/v13/ 
undervisningsmateriale/bhe-case_south-africa_summary.pdf.  
 82. Bhe 2005 (1) SA at paras. 1, 16; see Bond, supra note 77, at 533. 
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Succession Acts as unconstitutional.83 In reaching its decision, the 
Court relied in part on the international obligations to which South 
Africa was a party, stating:  
Having regard to these developments on the continent, the transformation 
of African communities from rural communities into urban and 
industrialised communities, and the role that women now play in our 
society, the exclusion of women from succeeding to the family head can 
no longer be justified. These developments must also be seen against the 
international instruments that protect women against discrimination, 
namely: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the African (Banjul) Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. In particular, CEDAW requires South Africa to 
ensure, amongst other things, the practical realisation of the principle of 
equality between men and women and to take all appropriate measures to 
modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices that 
constitutes [sic] discrimination against women.84 
Mokgadi Lucy Mailula, a judge of a High Court of South Africa, 
noted the significance of the Bhe decision, stating that Bhe “has 
ramifications which reach beyond the facts of the case, in the sense 
that, here, the court was required to weigh a long-established cultural 
norm against a gender issue. And the gender issue prevailed.”85 
Mailula goes on to note that Bhe represents “a successful negotiation 
of culture.”86 
F. Rono v. Rono and Ntutu: Kenya’s Inheritance Cases 
In 2005, in the case of Rono v. Rono, the Kenyan Court of 
Appeal relied on the Kenyan Constitution, the African Charter, and 
CEDAW to redistribute the deceased’s property according to 
principles of gender equality.87 In Rono, three sons claimed that they 
should inherit a larger portion of their father’s estate than their 
sisters, since “according to Keiyo traditions, girls have no right to 
inheritance of their father’s estate.”88 In rejecting the sons’ claims to 
a greater share of property, the judge noted, “I have gone at some 
length into international law provisions to underscore the view I take 
in this matter that the central issue relat[ed] to discrimination which 
                                                     
 83. See Bond, supra note 77, at 533. 
 84. Bhe 2005 (1) SA at para. 209 (footnotes omitted). 
 85. See Mokgadi Lucy Mailula, Gender, Culture and the Law: The South 
African Experience, in WITHOUT PREJUDICE, supra note 6, at 75, 80. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Rono v. Rono, (2008) 1 K.L.R. 803, 811-14, 816 (C.A.K.) (Kenya).  
 88. Id. at 805, 807-08. 
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this appeal raises, cannot be fully addressed by reference to domestic 
legislation alone.”89 
The court’s decision in Rono was influential in the 2008 case of 
In re Estate of Ntutu in which the Kenyan High Court at Nairobi 
applied the Law of Succession Act rather than Masai customary 
law.90 The customary law would have denied distribution of the 
estate to the daughters of the deceased.91 Relying on gender-equality 
principles in constitutional and international law, the court 
recognized the statutory law as the applicable law.92 The Court 
further held that even if Masai customary law were applicable, the 
Court would consider it “repugnant to justice and morality” and 
would invalidate it on that basis.93 
Both Rono and Ntutu were highly significant decisions for the 
development of women’s rights within Kenya. These cases also 
reflect the role that international law can play in litigation involving 
sex discrimination under customary law. Both courts carefully 
considered international human rights law, including CEDAW, in 
their decisions to strike discriminatory customary law in matters of 
inheritance. 
IV. LAW REFORM 
CEDAW has also helped to improve women’s rights in Africa 
through constitutional and legislative reform. In Uganda, for 
example, women’s rights groups relied on CEDAW as an organizing 
tool in their efforts to enshrine gender equality in the 1995 
Constitution.94 Similarly, the constitutional reform process in Kenya 
reflects a focus on CEDAW in the constitutional drafting process.95 
                                                     
 89. Id. at 814, 816. 
 90. In re Estate of Ntutu, (2008) e K.L.R. 1, 5-9 (H.C.K.) (Kenya). 
 91. Id. at 2. 
 92. Id. at 7-9. 
 93. Id. at 9. 
 94. See TSJEARD BOUTA, GEORG FRERKS & IAN BANNON, GENDER, 
CONFLICT, AND DEVELOPMENT 83 (2005) (noting that “CEDAW served as a starting 
point for rewriting Uganda’s constitution” and that women’s non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) “referred to CEDAW as establishing a minimum acceptable 
standard” when drafting proposals for the new constitution). 
 95. See ANDREW BYRNES & MARSHA A. FREEMAN, THE IMPACT OF THE 
CEDAW CONVENTION: PATHS TO EQUALITY 25 (2011), available at 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/9219/WDR2012-
0014.pdf?sequence=1 (noting that the 1997 amendment to Article 82(3) of the 
constitution (adding sex to the categories of prohibited discrimination) was “in 
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Beyond constitutionalism, CEDAW has also influenced the drafting 
of domestic law and policy in many countries. For example, the 
Department of Justice in South Africa relied on CEDAW in the 
process of drafting its Gender Policy. The drafters of the policy note 
the importance of CEDAW, listing the treaty “as one of the primary 
‘guiding principles’ that is to inform the transformation of the South 
African legal system.”96 In addition, South Africa adopted the 
Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998, explicitly acknowledging that 
the legislation is designed in part to honor the government’s 
commitments under CEDAW.97 Similarly, in accordance with 
CEDAW’s requirements, Zambia adopted a National Gender Policy 
and established a Gender in Development Division to work towards 
the elimination of discrimination against women.98 
In 2007, the CEDAW Committee recommended to the 
government of Sierra Leone that it prioritize the enactment of 
legislation promoting gender equality.99 Shortly after the CEDAW 
Committee’s recommendation, Sierra Leone passed three significant 
pieces of legislation, known collectively as the “Gender Acts.”100 
They include the Registration of Customary Marriage and Divorce 
Act (2009),101 the Devolution of Estates Act (2007), and the 
Domestic Violence Act (2007). All three acts represent important 
gains for women’s rights. The Registration of Customary Marriage 
and Divorce Act requires consent from both parties to the marriage 
and sets the minimum age for marriage at eighteen years of age.102 
The Devolution of Estates Act promotes equality in inheritance 
                                                                                                                
response to the State’s ratification of the Convention and other international 
treaties”). 
 96. BRINGING EQUALITY HOME, supra note 45, at 32.  
 97. Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 pmbl. (S. Afr.). 
 98. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, 26th Sess., 27th Sess., Jan. 14–-Feb. 1, 2002, June 3–21, 2002, ¶ 227, U.N. 
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 99. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, 37th, Sess., 38th Sess., 39th Sess., Jan. 15–Feb. 2, 2007, May 14–June 1, 
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Sess., Supp. No. 38 (2007). 
 100. LISA DENNEY & AISHA FOFANA IBRAHIM, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN 
SIERRA LEONE: HOW WOMEN SEEK REDRESS 6 (Dec. 2012), available at 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/523ac7a94.pdf. 
 101. While the Registration of Customary Marriage and Divorce Act of 2009 
was introduced in 2007, it was not signed into law until 2009.  
 102. Registration of Customary Marriage and Divorce Act of 2009 § 2(1) 
(Act No. 1/2009) (Sierra Leone). 
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matters.103 The Domestic Violence Act obligates the state to protect 
victims of domestic violence and defines violence broadly enough to 
encompass marital rape.104 
These are but a handful of examples of CEDAW’s influence in 
the area of legislative reform. Speaking more broadly of CEDAW’s 
impact on legislation, Savitri Goonesekere, who is a former member 
of the CEDAW Committee, remarks that “[t]he Committee’s 
concluding comments on the need for a holistic review of family 
law, and its critique of discrimination, have clearly provided an 
impetus for many countries to repeal received colonial law, 
transform customary laws, and initiate a process of local law reform 
based on commitments to CEDAW.”105 
V. PUBLIC EDUCATION 
Perhaps CEDAW’s greatest influence in Africa has been in the 
areas of public awareness and public education. Countless non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) have used CEDAW as a 
grassroots organizing tool to educate communities about women’s 
rights. The treaty provides an excellent overview of women’s rights 
in all sectors of life and includes women’s rights across the lifespan, 
thereby presenting a useful tool for NGOs to utilize in their women’s 
rights education campaigns. 
NGOs in Cameroon, for example, found CEDAW to be an 
effective tool to raise awareness of women’s rights among traditional 
leaders in that country.106 In 2007, NGOs summarized CEDAW and 
created a training manual entitled CEDAW Made Easy, which they 
used to “empower [traditional leaders] to use the Convention to bring 
about concrete improvements in the lives of women in their 
communities.”107 In addition, UNESCO has produced a pocket-sized 
book titled Passport to Equality, which explains and reproduces 
CEDAW and has been distributed around the world in nineteen 
                                                     
 103. See generally Devolution of Estates Act of 2007 (Act No. 21/2007) 
(Sierra Leone). 
 104. CEDAW Success Stories, UNIFEM, http://unifem.org/cedaw30/ 
success_stories (last visited Mar. 21, 2013); see also Domestic Violence Act of 2007 
(Act No. 20/2007) (Sierra Leone). 
 105. Savitri Goonesekere, Universalizing Women’s Human Rights Through 
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 106. CEDAW Success Stories, supra note 104. 
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different languages with the goal of raising awareness of women’s 
rights.108 Many NGOs have conducted gender-rights awareness and 
training programs on CEDAW, and some have utilized radio and 
television to spread the word about CEDAW to the general public. 
For instance, the European Union and United Nations Development 
Program’s (EU/UNDP) Gender Programme “contributed towards a 
wider awareness and understanding of women[’s] rights and the 
concept of gender equality” in Swaziland through its distribution of 
CEDAW in siSwati and by airing radio and television series on 
women’s rights.109 
CEDAW’s General Recommendation 19 and the U.N. 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women also 
became important consciousness-raising tools when campaigns 
against gender-based violence took center stage in the 1990s and 
have continued to be useful for anti-violence movements. For 
example, advocacy groups in Ghana utilized CEDAW to raise 
awareness about gender-based violence and mirrored the standards 
of General Recommendation 19 in Ghana’s 2007 Domestic Violence 
Act.110 According to Ghanaian scholars, “[p]rior to the championing 
of issues related to gender-based violence, public discourse on 
domestic violence was absent because it was largely seen as a private 
issue unworthy of documentation, literature, or statistics.”111 
Despite the progress that CEDAW has made possible in the 
realms of domestic litigation, law reform, and public education on 
gender equality, the Convention’s potential has been undermined by 
several weaknesses in the treaty and with its implementation. It is 
these challenges to which we now turn. 
                                                     
 108. SECTION FOR WOMEN & GENDER EQUAL., UNESCO, PASSPORT TO 
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VI. LIMITATIONS OF CEDAW  
The Convention was drafted in the late 1970s, during a time 
when the dominant discourse within the global women’s movement 
focused on discrimination against women qua women.112 At the time 
of CEDAW’s drafting, much feminist theory and advocacy focused 
on formal equality between women and men.113 CEDAW’s 
obligations nevertheless transcend that limited focus and include 
provisions that focus on substantive equality.114 
Despite CEDAW’s inclusion of provisions promoting 
substantive equality, the treaty’s text reflects a narrow focus on 
gender-based discrimination in isolation from other related, 
intersecting forms of discrimination. In the early 1990s, feminists of 
color within the United States and women’s rights activists in the 
global south began to expose the intersections between race and 
gender bias within the women’s rights and women’s human rights 
movements.115 Activists and scholars began to recognize the many 
ways in which discrimination might occur simultaneously along 
different axes of identity such as gender, race, ethnicity, sexual 
orientation, religion, or class.116 The analysis of the intersection of 
multiple personal and societal factors on the experience of 
discrimination came to be called intersectionality theory.117 
                                                     
 112. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 19 
(3d ed. 2013) (“The claim was simply stated and understood: Because women were 
the same as men in all relevant respects, they deserved access to all public 
institutions, benefits and opportunities on the same terms as men.”). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Alda Facio & Martha I. Morgan, Equity or Equality for Women? 
Understanding CEDAW’s Equality Principles, at i, 14 (IWRAW Asia Pac. 
Occasional Paper Series, Paper No. 14, 2009), available at http://www.iwraw-
ap.org/publications/doc/OPS14_Web.pdf (discussing the concept of substantive 
equality and its role in CEDAW). 
 115. See generally, e.g., Lisa A. Crooms, Indivisible Rights and 
Intersectional Identities or, “What Do Women’s Human Rights Have to Do with the 
Race Convention?”, 40 HOW. L.J. 619 (1997); Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, 
Gender-Related Aspects of Race Discrimination, U.N. Doc. EGM/GRD/2000/WP.1 
(2000); Radhika Coomaraswamy, To Bellow Like a Cow: Women, Ethnicity, and the 
Discourse of Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES 39 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994). 
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260 Michigan State Law Review  2014:241 
Intersectionality theory, in fact, opened the door for a more 
nuanced understanding of identity, constituted simultaneously of 
multiple ethnic, economic, cultural, and societal associations.118 This 
more complex notion of women’s identity also reflected the 
understanding that women could enjoy privilege based on one 
marker of identity and be a victim of discrimination based on another 
identity marker.119 This increased appreciation for the complexity of 
identity also meant that women should not be asked to simply choose 
between their desire for gender equality and their membership in a 
particular religious or ethnic community, for example.120 Exit from 
religious or ethnic communities whose standards fail to conform to 
gender equality standards remains an option for women. Women 
who value equality, however, may refuse to exit and may choose to 
work toward the promotion of equality within their communities 
instead.121 
The CEDAW Committee’s understanding of intersectionality 
theory and its impact on women around the world is evolving. At 
times, the Committee still appears somewhat reductionist in its view 
of women as one-dimensional victims of custom and culture.122 This 
is not universally true, however. The language of CEDAW itself 
insinuates this approach, since two of the three references to culture 
in the Convention treat it as regressive.123 On this point, CEDAW 
scholar and commentator, Andrew Byrnes, counters:  
While it is certainly the case that much of the discussion around matters of 
culture and tradition in the CEDAW context focuses on the negative 
impact on women’s enjoyment of human rights, that is hardly surprising, 
given that the purpose of the Convention is to respond to violations of 
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Article 13, which provides that women should enjoy an equal right to “participate in 
recreational activities, sports and all aspects of cultural life.” CEDAW, supra note 1, 
at 19; see also Bond, supra note 77, at 519-20.  
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women’s human rights, and a goal of the reporting procedure is to identify 
shortfalls and difficulties with a view to addressing them.124 
Sally Engle Merry demonstrates the Committee’s rather blunt 
approach to culture. Merry notes that the U.N. treaty bodies’ 
“tendency to see culture as a problem is enhanced by their 
commitment to a model of legal rationality, an idea that is 
incompatible with celebrating local cultural complexity.”125 Merry 
discusses the CEDAW Committee’s problematic approach to the 
practice in Fiji of bulubulu, which is a custom in Fijian culture for 
reconciling disputes.126 In recent years, the practice has been used to 
persuade prosecutors to drop rape charges and to convince 
magistrates to mitigate sentences.127 The contemporary application of 
the custom in this context is highly detrimental to women and must 
obviously be curtailed. There should, however, be a nuanced analysis 
of custom, including its possible benefits to women—if any. 
According to Merry, in the case of bulubulu, the Committee 
demanded to know if the custom had been completely abolished 
without creating any discursive space for the recognition of its 
possible merits or for acknowledging how the tradition has changed 
over time.128 
The Maputo Protocol, on the other hand, offers a more nuanced 
approach to culture and tradition. The Maputo Protocol categorically 
rejects harmful cultural traditions.129 At the same time, Article 17 of 
the Protocol states, “Women shall have the right to live in a positive 
cultural context and to participate at all levels in the determination of 
cultural policies.”130 The Protocol explicitly values the positive 
aspects of culture while simultaneously condemning those 
manifestations of culture that are harmful or discriminatory to 
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women.131 One must not underestimate the signaling value of 
articulating a positive role for culture in women’s lives. 
Because the Protocol explicitly values the positive aspects of 
culture and cultural identity, women are less likely to feel as though 
they are forced to choose between their identities as members of 
cultural, racial, ethnic, or religious communities and their identities 
as rights-seeking individuals who are committed to gender equality. 
The Protocol, therefore, comes closer to reflecting the reality that 
cultural, racial, ethnic, and religious identity intersects with gender 
identity in meaningful ways in women’s lives.  
Although CEDAW’s influence can be felt in the text of the 
Protocol, the Protocol takes a more nuanced approach to culture and 
tradition, explicitly acknowledging the positive role that it can play 
in women’s lives. As such, the Protocol has the potential for greater 
resonance among women’s rights activists in the region and around 
the world. Indeed, women should continue to play a role in shaping 
and re-shaping culture and tradition in ways that reflect a steadfast 
commitment to gender equality. The Protocol, in fact, explicitly 
supports women in this endeavor. 
CONCLUSION 
The architecture and influence of CEDAW is evident in the text 
of the Maputo Protocol. The Protocol, therefore, stands as yet 
another example of the many ways in which CEDAW has improved 
the lives of women in sub-Saharan Africa. CEDAW has played a 
role in critical test case litigation, law reform and constitution 
drafting, and public awareness and rights education. CEDAW’s 
success in promoting women’s equality through test case litigation 
has been mixed, with early successes confined to rights contests 
involving the public sphere. Unity Dow’s successful challenge to 
facially discriminatory nationality legislation in Botswana is an 
example of these early successes. Cases from the 1990s, such as 
Magaya, challenging discrimination in the private sphere of family 
law where customary law often controls, were less successful. More 
recent cases out of South Africa and Kenya, including the Bhe case 
and the Ntutu case, respectively, offer hope that customary law will 
not shield personal or family law cases from constitutional scrutiny. 
                                                     
 131. Article 5 of the Protocol obligates States parties to “prohibit and 
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The Maputo Protocol also highlights a limitation of CEDAW, 
however. In contrast to CEDAW, the Protocol’s explicit treatment of 
culture and tradition as potentially positive and healthy may resonate 
more strongly with women who value both equality and membership 
in a cultural community. The Maputo Protocol offers insight that 
could be useful to the CEDAW Committee as it attempts to navigate 
difficult and entrenched conflicts concerning women’s human rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
